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Abstract—If Alice must communicate with Bob over a channel
shared with the adversarial Eve, then Bob must be able to
validate the authenticity of the message. In particular we consider
the model where Alice and Eve share a discrete memoryless
multiple access channel with Bob, thus allowing simultaneous
transmissions from Alice and Eve. By traditional random coding
arguments, we demonstrate an inner bound on the rate at
which Alice may transmit, while still granting Bob the ability to
authenticate. Furthermore this is accomplished in spite of Alice
and Bob lacking a pre-shared key, as well as allowing Eve prior
knowledge of both the codebook Alice and Bob share and the
messages Alice transmits.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study physical layer authentication over
a noisy multiple access channel and no pre-shared key. Such
scenarios may occur when a network is established in a hostile
environment. Being able to trust the information observed is
just as important as actually observing it. It also stands to
reason, that always having a pre-shared key seems restrictive
as it is dependent on a method to generate and secure the
key. We model this scenario by considering two transmitters
(Alice and ne’er-do-well Eve) and one receiver (Bob). Alice
and Eve share a discrete memoryless multiple access channel
(DM-MAC), so that not only may Eve try to forge messages to
Bob, she may try to modify the ones Alice transmits. To further
complicate the matter, we assume that Eve not only knows the
codebook which Alice and Bob share, but the message Alice
will send as well. Our goal is for Bob to be able to validate
the authenticity of the sender (or alternatively the integrity of
the information), as well as be able to decode the information
given it is authentic.
Simmons first studied physical layer authentication in [1].
Simmons allowed for Alice and Bob to have a pre-shared key,
which Eve did not have access to. This key, which can be
made small relative to the number of symbols it protects, in
essence partitions the entire state of messages into sets which
are valid and ones that are not. Any attempt by Eve to modify
the message then results, with high probability, in a message
included in the invalid set.
Physical layer authentication, without the use of pre-shared
key, was considered by Maurer in [2]. Instead of a pre-shared
key, Alice, Bob, and Eve are given given access to different
random variables, which share some arbitrary correlation.
By using their individual random variables, Alice and Bob
proceed in public discussion over a perfect channel to generate
a secret key. This is related to authentication in that the channel
being perfect allows Eve the ability to perfectly spoof any
packet from Alice. Hence, the distributions of the random
variables play a pivotal role in establishing the authenticity
of any message. In this model the three nodes must share
copies of a random variable generated from an independent
and identically distributed (iid) source. And furthermore the
variables that Alice and Bob share must not be “simulatable”
by Eve given her random variable. Use of an iid source though
guarantees no underlying code structure, which could leak
information about the random variables Alice and Bob view. It
is also impractical in scenarios not concerned with secrecy to
first generate a secret key for authentication purposes in later
transmissions.
Because of these limits others have studied authentication
in noisy channels. Works include Yu et al. who in [3] used
spread spectrum techniques in addition to a covert channel to
ensure authentication [3]. And Xiao et al in [4], who used the
unique scattering of individual users in indoor environments
to authenticate packets. For purpose of discussion we focus on
two works in particular. First, Lai et al., who in [5] considered
the problem of authentication in a noisy channel model when
Alice and Bob have a pre-shared key. In their model the
link between Bob and Alice is noisy while the link between
Eve and Bob is noise-free, a worst case scenario. Much like
the work of Simmons, the key Alice and Bob share is used
to label some transmitted sequences as valid and not. And
much like Simmons work, it is then nearly impossible for
Eve to pick a transmitted message that would be valid. The
second work, is that of Jiang [6]. Jiang in specific considered
the case where either Alice or Eve may transmit to Bob,
but not simultaneously. By assuming the channels distinct,
Jiang showed that even without a pre-shared secret key it
was possible to guarantee authentication. This was done by
considering the intersection of the distributions Alice could
induce at Bob and the distributions Eve could induce at Bob
had only marginal overlap if the channel from Alice to Bob
was not simulatable using the channel from Eve to Bob.
In contrast, by allowing simultaneous communication, we
allow more possibilities for Eve’s attack. This is because Eve
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Fig. 1: Channel model
does not need to attack the entire message transmitted, only
a smaller portion, and thus only slightly disturb the distribu-
tions, which as mentioned previously were critical to ensuring
authentication. Much like Jiang, we do this by showing that
the distributions induced by the legitimate party, and the ones
by the illegitimate party have marginal overlap. Unlike Jiang
though, we approach the problem using traditional random
coding methods and techniques. We derive a new inner bound,
which is dependent on the channel not having a simulatable-
like property. Unlike simulability though, this property can be
controlled in part by Alice and her choice of distribution.
II. NOTATION
Random variables will be denoted by upper case letters,
their alphabets will be the script version of that letter, and
particular realizations of that random variable will be denoted
in lower case. In other words, X is a random variable, and
x ∈ X is a particular realization of X . The n-th extension of a
random variable is denoted Xn, and particular realizations of
that random variable are denoted similarly by xn. To represent
a particular value in the n-th extension we use subscripts, such
as xi is the value in the i-th position of xn.
When the need arises for discussion of the actual distri-
bution of the random variable over their particular alpha-
bet, we will use P with that related random variable as a
subscript (PX is the distribution X has over X ). When the
distribution is clear from context, we drop the subscript. By
X c Y c Z we denote when X,Y, Z form a Markov chain(
PZ,Y |X(z, y|x) = PZ|Y (z|y)PY |X(y|x)
)
.
By Tn[X] we define the set{
xn :
∑
x∈X |Pxn(x)− PX(x)| ≤ δn
}
, where Pxn(x)
is the induced type of xn. Generally, Tn[X] is referred
to as a strongly typical set. We assume that δ follows
the delta convention outlined in [7, Convention 2.11].
Furthermore by H(X) and H(X|Y ) we define the entropy
(conditional entropy resp.) of random variable X (X
given Y resp.), where H(X) = −∑x P (x) log2 P (x) and
H(X|Y ) = −∑x,y P (x, y) log2 P (x|y). Finally by I(X;Y )
we denote the mutual information of random variables X and
Y , where I(X;Y ) =
∑
x,y P (x, y) log2
P (x,y)
P (x)P (y) .
III. CHANNEL MODEL
For our channel model, graphically represented in Figure 1,
Alice and Eve share a DM-MAC (X × V, PY |X,V ,Y) with
Bob. Alice wishes to transmit a message m ∈ M, while
Eve attempts to modify its content so that Bob will believe
Alice transmitted some mˆ ∈ M that is not equal to m. By
n we denote the number of symbols that will be transmitted
over the channel. Alice uses a possibly stochastic function
f :M→ Xn to generate her sequence which she transmits.
Eve simultaneously chooses a sequence vn ∈ Vn as a function
of the message and encoder, which she transmits concurrently
with Alice’s transmission. We assume that there exists an
element ∅ ∈ V representative of the state when Eve decides
not to transmit (hence Eve not attacking is denoted V n = ∅n.)
Because the distribution associated with the output of the MAC
when Eve is silent is of distinct importance, we refer to it
specifically by PY |X,∅(x). In general, Bob will receive a value
yn ∈ Yn, and then will use a decoder ϕ : Yn →M∪ {!} to
either output an estimate of the message, or instead to declare
that Eve is attempting to intrude. We assume that Alice, Bob
and Eve have access to the encoder f and the decoder ϕ.
IV. THEOREMS AND DEFINITIONS
We expect the code to decode to the correct message when
Eve is not attacking (V n = ∅n), and to either decode to the
correct message or detect manipulation when Eve is attacking
(V n 6= ∅n). These expectations lead directly lead to the
following definition for our physical layer authentication code.
Definition 1. A (n,R, 1, 2)-physical layer authentication
code is any encoder-decoder pair (f, ϕ), for which the encoder
takes 2nR messages and the decoder satisfies
Pr {ϕ(Y n) 6=M |V n = ∅n} ≤ 1
Pr {ϕ(Y n) 6=M ∪ !|V n 6= ∅n} ≤ 2.
A code which meets these two requirements, can both de-
code and authenticate with high probability. We do not concern
ourselves with the optimization of these two probabilities,
and instead focus first on guaranteeing existence. As we will
show using random coding, there exist codes such that both
probabilities go to zero as n grows to infinity. Section V
establishes the following inner bound on the rate of a physical
layer authentication code.
Theorem 2.
lim
(n,1,2)→(∞,0,0)
max
R:∃ a (n,R,1,2) code
R ≥ max
U∈U+
I(Y ;U |V = ∅)
where U+ contains all U such that
• PY,X,U (y, x, u) = PY |X,∅(y|x)PX|U (x|u)PU (u)
•
∑
x,u˜,v PY |X,V (y|x, v)PX|U (x|u)PU,V |U ′(u, v|u′) 6=∑
x PY |X,∅(y|x)PX|U (x|u′) for all distributions PU,V,U ′
such that PU (u) = PU ′(u).
If the distribution PX which achieves capacity is a member
of U+, then the inner bound is also an outer bound. In general
though, this is not the case. The necessity of auxiliary random
variable U can be demonstrated through a simple example.
Let Y = {0, 1, 2}, X = {0, 1} and V = {∅, 0, 1}, and define
the DM-MAC by
PY |X,V =
.9 .1 .1 0 0 .9.1 .9 .9 0 0 .1
0 0 0 1 1 0

where the realizations of X,V are enumerated
(0, ∅), (1, ∅), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1). For this channel
though, choosing
PX,V |Xˆ =

PX|Xˆ(0|0) 0
0 PX|Xˆ(1|1)
0 PX|Xˆ(0|1)
0 0
0 0
PX|Xˆ(1|0) 0

,
results in
PY |X,V PX,V |Xˆ =
.9 .1.1 .9
0 0
 = PY |X,∅.
Thus PX /∈ U+ for all distributions PX . Now, instead
lets introduce the auxiliary random variable U , and set
U = {0, 1}, with PX|U (0|0) = PX|U (1|1) = p and
PX|U (0|1) = PX|U (1|0) = 1 − p. It is clear that if Y = 2
then Bob can detect Eve, which corresponds to the case∑
x,u,v PY |X,V (2|x, v)PX|U (x|u)PU,V |U ′(u, v|u′) > 0.
In specific the value 2 results with probability
1 if (x, v) equal (0, 1) or (1, 0) thus Eve
must have
∑
u PX|U (1|u)PU,V |U ′(u, 0|u′) =∑
u PX|U (0|u)PU,V |U ′(u, 1|u′) = 0. Clearly, assuming
p < .5, PX|U (1|u) ≥ p and PX|U (0|u) ≥ p. Thus it
follows that PV |U ′(0|u′) = PV |U ′(1|u′) = 0. By adding
an auxiliary random variable, we have now made the inner
bound non-empty and thus increased our inner bound region.
In this example it is not hard to see that in fact we can let
p→ 0 and approach capacity.
Finally, in this work we assume that Eve knows the message
m and encoding function f . Why not allow for Eve to know
xn as well? While this does in fact make Eve more powerful,
it actually simplifies the math. Indeed allowing Eve knowledge
of xn results in the property that for every (n,R, 1, 2)-
physical layer authentication code there exist a corresponding
deterministic (n,R, ′1, 
′
2) physical layer authentication code
such that ′1 + 
′
2 ≤ 1 + 2. This follows because for any M
Pr {ϕ(Y n) 6=M |V n = ∅n,M = m}+
+ Pr {ϕ(Y n) 6=M ∪ !|V n 6= ∅n}
=
∑
xn
P (xn|m) (Pr {ϕ(Y n) 6=M |V n = ∅n, Xn = xn}
+Pr {ϕ(Y n) 6=M ∪ !|V n 6= ∅n, Xn = xn})
≥ min
xn:P (xn|m)>0
(Pr {ϕ(Y n) 6=M |V n = ∅n, Xn = xn}
+Pr {ϕ(Y n) 6=M ∪ !|V n 6= ∅n, Xn = xn}) .
Thus the existence of a sequence of rate R codes such that 1
and 2 converge to 0, implies the existence of a sequence of
rate R deterministic codes for which ′1 and 
′
2 converge to 0
as well. Hence considering deterministic encoders is sufficient
for determining the maximum rate. Restricting the codes in
Section V results in the same conditions except without the
auxiliary U , with X instead replacing it. Our inner bound then
is strictly smaller, as one would expect, due to the arguments
of our example.
V. ACHIEVABILITY
A. Construction
Fix a distribution PU,X . Define R = 1n log2 |M|, and for all
m ∈M randomly and independently select un(m) ∈ TnU . For
transmission, Alice chooses a value of xn according to the
distribution P (xn|un(m)) = ∏ni=1 P (xi|ui(m)), and sends
the value over the DM-MAC, PY |X,V . Bob, who receives a
sequence yn from the channel, uses the decoder defined by
ϕ(yn) =

m if yn ∈ Tn[Y |U,∅](un(m))
and yn /∈ ⋃mˆ(6=m)∈M Tn[Y |U,∅](un(mˆ))
! otherwise,
to estimate the message or declare intrusion.
For the remainder of the paper, by Un we will denote the
random variable over the codebooks. Any particular un is itself
a function which defines a distribution over xn as given earlier.
B. Reliability under no attack
Given that V n = ∅n, an error will occur if either yn /∈
Tn[Y |U,∅](u
n(m)) or if yn ∈ ⋃mˆ(6=m)∈M Tn[Y |U,∅](un(mˆ)).
By using the union bound we may individually consider the
probabilities of the two events. For the first event there exists
an n → 0 such that
Pr
{
Y n /∈ Tn[Y |U,∅](un(m))
∣∣∣V n = ∅n} ≤ n, (1)
by [7, Lemma 2.12]. For the second, the existence of an ′n →
0 for which
Pr
Y n ∈ ⋃
mˆ( 6=M)∈M
Tn[Y |U,∅](u
n(mˆ))
 ≤ ′n (2)
whenever R < I(Y ;U)−λn, for some λn → 0, can be shown
through traditional random coding arguments.
C. Detection
For any codebook, the value of
Pr {ϕ(Y n) 6=M ∪ !|V n 6= ∅n} is fixed. We want to
show that the average over all codebooks results in
Pr {ϕ(Y n) 6=M ∪ !|V n 6= ∅n} → 0 as n increases. If the
average probability of error for both the cases when Eve
attacks and when she does not, converge to 0, then there
must exist a sequence of codes where the individual errors
converge to 0 as well.
For the probability of error given Eve attacking
EUn Pr {ϕ(Y n) 6=M ∪ !|V n 6= ∅n}
≤ Pr
Y n ∈ ⋃
mˆ 6=M
Tn[Y |U,∅](U
n(mˆ))
∣∣∣∣∣∣V n 6= ∅n

= EMPr
Y n∈ ⋃
mˆ 6=m
Tn[Y |U,∅](U
n(mˆ))
∣∣∣∣∣∣V n 6= ∅n,M = m
 .
(3)
By symmetry we need only consider a particular value of m ∈
M , and hence we focus on
Pr
Y n ∈ ⋃
mˆ6=m
Tn[Y |U,∅](U
n(mˆ))
∣∣∣∣∣∣M = m,V n 6= ∅n
 .
(4)
The probability of error in this case is dependent on what
Eve decides to transmit, which as mentioned previously is
dependent upon the codebook, un, and the actual message
transmitted m. For every codebook then, it is important to
consider the probability of a value particular yn occurring
given the codebook, message, and sequence transmitted. This
is made explicit by writing equation (4) as
∑
un,vn,yn
P (yn, vn, un|M = m)1
yn∈⋃
mˆ 6=m
Tn[Y |U,∅](u
n(mˆ))
 .
(5)
Next we seek to determine the probability of error given
a particular codebook and vn. This action is equivalent to
summing over yn, for equation (5) can be written∑
un,vn,yn
P (vn, un|M = m)
·
∑
yn
P (yn|un, vn,M = m)1
yn∈⋃
mˆ6=m
Tn[Y |U,∅](u
n(mˆ))
 .
(6)
Consider P (yn|un, vn,M = m), for a fixed value un(m), vn,
there exists an n → 0 such that
Pr
{
Y n /∈ Tn[Y |U,V ](un(m), vn)
∣∣∣un(m), vn} ≤ n, (7)
due to [7, Lemma 2.12]. Furthermore because the distribution
PX|U is considered fixed, and because the δn defining the
typical set (recall Section II), there exists a λn → 0 such that∣∣∣∣− 1n log2 P (yn|un, vn,M = m)−H(Y |U˜ , V˜ )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ λn (8)
where U˜ , V˜ are random variables that are jointly distributed
according to the type induced from un(m), vn, due to [7,
Problem 2.5.b]. Because the distribution of un(m), vn is
not fixed over all values of un(m) and vn, to efficiently
apply equations (7) and (8) we must partition the values
of (un(m), vn) so that over every partition we only need
worry about a single distribution. To this end, let the set
Q contain all possible joint distributions on U × V . With a
slight abuse of notation, a particular realization of Q will be
denoted Q in order to emphasize that Q is representative of a
certain distribution over U × V . Introducing Q and applying
equations (7) and (8), we may upper bound equation (6) by
n +
∑
Q∈Q
∑
un,vn:(un(m),vn)∈TnQ
p(un, vn|M = m)
·
∑
yn
2−n(H(Y |U,V,Q=Q)−λn)
· 1
yn ∈ ⋃
mˆ6=m
Tn[Y |U,∅](u
n(mˆ)) ∩ Tn[Y |U,V ](un(m), vn)
 .
(9)
We have introduced the notation H(Y |U, V,Q = Q) into
equation (9) to make explicit the dependence of the entropy
on the distribution of (un(m), vn). Having dealt with the
term P (yn|un, vn,M = m), we turn towards completing the
summation. To this end,
n +
∑
Q∈Q
∑
un,vn:(un(m),vn)∈TnQ
p(un, vn|M = m)
·
∑
mˆ 6=m
2−n(H(Y |U,V,Q=Q)−λn)
· max
(U ′, U, V ) :
(un(mˆ), un(m), vn) ∈ TnU ′,U,V
PY |U ′ = PY |U,V=∅
PY |U,V = PY |U,V,Q=Q
2n(H(Y |U
′,U,V )+λ′n). (10)
is an upper bound of equation (9). Equation (10) follows first
from
1
yn ∈ ⋃
mˆ6=m
Tn[Y |U,∅](u
n(mˆ)) ∩ Tn[Y |U,V ](un(m), vn)

≤
∑
mˆ6=m
1
(
Tn[Y |U,∅](u
n(mˆ)) ∩ Tn[Y |U,V ](un(m), vn)
)
. (11)
And secondly from [7, Problem 2.10],∑
yn
1
(
yn ∈ Tn[Y |U,∅](un(mˆ)) ∩ Tn[Y |U,V ](un(m), vn)
)
≤ max
(U ′, U, V ) :
(un(mˆ), un(m), vn) ∈ TnU ′,U,V
PY |U ′ = PY |U,V=∅
PY |U,V = PY |U,V,Q=Q
2n(H(Y |U
′,U,V )+λ′n). (12)
While it may appear that the bound induced from equation (11)
introduces a large amount of error, due to channel coding
it does not. Recall that Tn[Y |U,∅](u
n(mˆ)) are representative
of the region for which the decoder outputs mˆ. These re-
gions should rarely overlap, and thus it is most likely that
for a yn, there is only a single value of m for which
1
(
Tn[Y |U,∅](u
n(mˆ)) ∩ Tn[Y |U,V ](un(m), vn)
)
is non zero.
Letting Q+ be the set of all distributions on U × U × V
which may meet the requirements presented in the max of
equation (12), and NQ+(un, vn,m) be the number of mˆ such
that (un(mˆ), un(m), vn) ∈ TnQ+ , we can more succinctly write
equation (10) by
n +
∑
Q+∈Q+
∑
un,vn
p(un, vn|M = m)NQ+(un, vn,m)
· 2−n(I(Y ;U ′|U,V,Q+=Q+)−λ˜n), (13)
where λ˜n = λn + λ′n. The Q term has been removed since it
is uniquely determined by Q+. We now turn our attention to
giving an upper bound NQ+(un, vn,m), which will complete
the proof.
In fact, there exists a λˆn → 0 such
Pr
{
NQ+(U
n, vn,m) > 2
n
(|R−I(U ′;U,V |Q+=Q+)|++λˆn)}
≤ e−n2 , (14)
due to the Hoeffding bound, alternatively [7,
Lemma 17.9]. This is because NQ+(un, vn,m) =∑
mˆ 1
(
(un(mˆ), un(m), vn) ∈ TnQ+
)
, and hence since
each codeword is chosen independently from the distribution,
Pr
{
NQ+(U
n, vn,m) > α
}
is simply the probability that
the sum of 2nR − 1 independent and identically distributed
binomial random variables is greater than α. In this case the
probability of the random variable can be upper bounded by
2−n(I(U
′;U,V |Q+=Q+)−ζn) for some ζn → 0.
Therefore there exists a ˜n → 0, λˆ′n → 0 such that
˜n +
∑
Q+∈Q+
∑
un,vn
p(un, vn|M = m)
· 2n
(|R−I(U ′;U,V |Q+=Q+)|+−I(Y ;U ′|U,V,Q+=Q+)+λˆ′n),
(15)
upper bounds (13) since the maximum value of
NQ+(u
n, vn,m) < 2nR, and 2nRe−n
2 → 0. By summing
over all un, vn and then recognizing since Q is at most
polynomial in n, we obtain an εn → 0 such that
˜n
+ max
Q+∈Q+
2
n
(|R−I(U ′;U,V |Q+=Q+)|+−I(Y ;U ′|U,V,Q+=Q+)+εn),
(16)
upper bounds equation (15).
Equation (16) leaves us with a bound dependent on the
value of I(U ′;U, V |Q+ = Q+) when compared to R for
the maximum value of Q+ ∈ Q+. Consider the case where
R > I(U ′;U, V |Q+ = Q+), where equation (15) becomes
˜n + 2
n(R−I(Y,U,V ;U ′|Q+=Q+)+εn).
For R < I(Y ;U |V = ∅)−εn this term converges to 0. Indeed,
recall that PY |U ′ = PY |U,∅ for all Q+ ∈ Q+, and that
I(Y,U, V ;U ′|Q+ = Q+) ≥ I(Y ;U ′|Q+ = Q+)
= I(Y ;U |V = ∅).
Conceptually, this bound relates to attacks where Eve does not
care what value of m Bob chooses, as long as it is not mˆ.
Now, consider the alternative situation in which R <
I(U ′;U, V, Y |Q+ = Q+), for which equation (16) reduces
to
˜n + 2
−n(I(Y ;U ′|U,V,Q+=Q+)−εn),
which clearly goes to 0 if I(Y ;U ′|U, V,Q+ = Q+) 6→ 0. But
I(Y ;U ′|U, V,Q+ = Q+) = 0 if and only if∑
x,u,v
PY |X,V (y|x, v)PX|U (x|u)PU,V |U ′(u, v|u′)
=
∑
x
PY |X,∅(y|x)PX|U (x|u′), (17)
for the condition implies that U ′ c U, V c Y . Combin-
ing back the two situations, and excluding the distribu-
tions of PU,X such that there exists a V satisfying equa-
tion (17) gives that on average for our coding scheme
Pr {ϕ(Y n) 6=M ∪ !|V n 6= ∅n} → 0. Which as discussed
prior proves the existence of a set of codes which satisfy our
inner bound.
VI. DISCUSSION
Of critical importance in our result is the ability of Eve to
find a distribution V such that I(Y ;U ′|U, V ) = 0. By fixing
U = u, this implies I(Y ;U ′|U = u, V ) = 0, which implies
the channel must be “simulatable” (see [2]) given U = u in
order for Eve to manipulate those values of U . On the other
hand fixing V = v gives that the channel must be manipulable
(see [8]) for all values of V Eve chooses to use.
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